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TORTS SURVEY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1994 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals hand-
ed down four noteworthy products liability decisions. While virtually every
jurisdiction has adopted some form of the Restatement (Second) of Torts'
provisions on products liability,' the application of those provisions varies
between jurisdictions and requires an oftentimes challenging application of the
Erie Doctrine.2 This survey will focus on the Tenth Circuit's ability to ascer-
tain state law given varying degrees of certainty as to how the respective
state's highest court would decide the issue. Part I examines the Tenth
Circuit's application of the Erie Doctrine given a relatively clear indication of
current law from the state's highest court. In Wagner v. Case Corp.3 and
Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co., the Tenth Circuit, after noting a
recent change in Colorado law, held that Colorado's statutory presumptions for
products liability actions are only applicable in cases where the plaintiff fails
to make out a prima facie case that the product is defective.5 These cases
demonstrate that the Colorado Supreme Court has rendered the statutory pre-
sumptions for products liability actions effectively meaningless.
Part II examines the Tenth Circuit's application of the Erie Doctrine in a
case without any authoritative pronouncement of state law from the state's
highest court. In Allen v. Minnstar, Inc.,6 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Utah
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. In products liability cases, the basis for federal court jurisdiction is most often diversity
of citizenship. A typical products liability lawsuit involves an injured plaintiff from state A suing
a manufacturer from state B. Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction requires: 1) that the plaintiff and
defendant are citizens of different states; and 2) that the plaintiff is seeking more than $50,000 in
damages from the defendant. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §
2.6, at 27 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the diversity jurisdiction requirements).
In the landmark case Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the United States
Supreme Court announced what has become known as the Erie Doctrine. In cases where diversity
of citizenship is the basis for federal jurisdiction, federal courts must ascertain and apply the law
of the state whose law is controlling, under applicable choice of law principles, such that the
result reached in federal court is the same result that would have been reached had the case been
tried in state court. See id. at 78. Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply a state's law in
accordance with the decisions of that state's highest court. Id. at 79. If the state's highest court has
not decided the issue presently before the federal court, the federal court must make its best at-
tempt to predict how the state's highest court would decide the issue. Id. at 78-79.
The Erie Doctrine was necessary to prevent forum shopping and to create uniformity in
decisions. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, §§ 4.1-4.5 (discussing the Court's reasoning
in Erie and tracing the modem development of the Erie Doctrine). If federal courts were not
bound to apply state law as the state's highest court would, there would be no uniformity of deci-
sions. Id. A plaintiff would sue in state court if the state's laws were more favorable to her case,
or in a federal court if its laws were of more help. Id. In Erie, the Supreme Court decided that, as
a matter of public policy, forum shopping would no longer be allowed. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-79.
3. 33 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
4. 4 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Wagner, 33 F.3d at 1254; Perlmutter, 4 F.3d at 874-75.
6. 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
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District Court's ruling that in order to prevail in a products liability action
based on defective design, a plaintiff must prove that an alternative, safer
design existed at the time the product was placed into the stream of com-
merce.7 Although the Utah Supreme Court had not addressed the issue, the
Tenth Circuit's decision is in accord with the modem trend.
Part III examines the Tenth Circuit's application of the Erie Doctrine
when left with little guidance from the state's highest court as to how it would
decide the matter. In Holt v. Deere & Co.,' the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Oklahoma District Court, holding that the district court did not err in submit-
ting the issue of voluntary assumption of risk to the jury.9 In reaching this
conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied on various Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
sions that indicated a willingness, in most cases, to submit the defense of
assumption of risk to the jury.
I. STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS: WAGNER V. CASE CORP.'0 AND
PERLMU7TER V. UNITED STATES GYPSUM CO."
A. Background
Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-21-403 establishes two presumptions
to be used in products liability actions when applicable. The statute states in
relevant part:
(1) In any product liability action, it shall be rebuttably presumed that
the product which caused the injury, death, or property damage was
not defective and that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not
negligent if the product:
(a) Prior to sale by the manufacturer, conformed to the
state of the art, as distinguished from industry standards,
applicable to such product in existence at the time of
sale ....
(3) Ten .years after a product is first sold for use or consumption, it
shall be rebuttably presumed that the product was not defective and
that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not negligent and that all
warnings and instructions were proper and adequate. 2
The Colorado courts, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, gave this
statute varying interpretations. The Colorado Supreme Court initiated the con-
fusion in 1983 when it stated in a footnote to its decision in Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen 3 that the state-of-the-art presumption of
section 13-21-403(1)(a) "acts as rebuttable evidence of the non-defectiveness
7. Id. at 1477.
8. 24 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1994).
9. Id. at 1295.
10. 33 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
11. 4 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1993).
12. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1987). These presumptions are referred to throughout
the Survey as the state-of-the-art presumption and the ten-year presumption.
13. 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983).
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of any product which may be the subject of a products liability action."'" Al-
though the state-of-the-art presumption was not at issue in Belle Bonfils, later
courts cited to that decision when holding that the state-of-the-art and ten-year
presumptions were rebuttable evidence.
Three years later, in Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc.,'5 the Colorado Su-
preme Court affirmed a trial judge's instruction informing the jury of the ten-
year presumption created by section 13-21-403(3). In Uptain, the trial court
allowed the defendant-manufacturer to introduce evidence that it had marketed
the allegedly defective product for twenty-five years, and that during that pe-
riod of time no claims were filed regarding the product's alleged defective-
ness. 6 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that
the evidence was admissible because it was relevant to the defendant's request
for a jury instruction on the ten-year presumption of section 13-21-403(3).'"
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit decided Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co.'" In
Tafoya, an owner of a riding lawnmower brought action against the seller and
manufacturer claiming his injury was a result of the mowers defective de-
sign.'9 The Tenth Circuit held that both the ten-year and state-of-the-art pre-
sumptions of section 13-21-403 need not be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence; a simple preponderance of the evidence would suffice."
Finally, in Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz,2' the Colorado Supreme Court
put an end to the confusion regarding the use of the ten-year presumption in
products liability actions. The Court held that the trial court should not have
instructed the jury on the ten-year presumption because the plaintiff, to make
out a prima facie products liability case, must come forward with sufficient
evidence of the product's defectiveness to withstand a motion for a directed
verdict.22 The court reasoned that once the plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to defeat a motion for a directed verdict, the presumption has neces-
sarily been rebutted and no reason exists for an instruction to the jury regard-
ing the presumption.23 The court did not indicate whether its holding should
be expanded to apply to the other products liability presumptions found in
section 13-21-403.
14. Id. at 126 n.14 (citation omitted).
15. 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986).
16. Id. at 1331.
17. Id.
18. 884 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled by Wagner v. Case Corp., 33 F.3d 1253 (10th
Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 1331.
20. Id. at 1335-36.
21. 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id.
1995]
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B. The Tenth Circuit Applies Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz:24
Wagner v. Case Corp.25 and Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co.26
Following the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Mile Hi Concrete,
the Tenth Circuit has twice addressed whether Colorado's statutory presump-
tions are of any import in products liability actions brought in the federal
district courts. In Perlmutter and Wagner, two distinct products liability pre-
sumptions were at issue. In Perlmutter, developers of a shopping mall brought
strict products liability and negligence actions against the manufacturer of a
plaster product containing asbestos.27 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the developers on the negligence and failure to warn claims, and in favor of
the manufacturer on the strict liability claim.2" On appeal, the manufacturer
argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a jury instruction as to the
effect of the ten-year presumption.29 The Tenth Circuit cited Mile Hi Con-
crete and stated that an instruction based on the ten-year presumption "is not
necessary if the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion
for directed verdict.
30
The Wagner decision presented a somewhat more difficult problem for the
Tenth Circuit. In Wagner, the plaintiff had been injured by a loader/backhoe
manufactured by Case corporation.3 The plaintiff alleged that the product
was defective because Case had failed to install a lockout mechanism to pre-
vent the inadvertent activation of the backhoe.32 Over the plaintiff's objec-
tions, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
[If you find that (1) prior to any sale by the Case Corporation,
the ... [b]ackhoe conformed to the state of the art, as distinguished
from industry standards, and (2) such state of the art was applicable
to such products as the ... [b]ackhoe at the time of such sale, then
the law presumes the . . .[b]ackhoe was not defective.33
The jury returned a verdict for the Case Corporation.34
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit cited Mile Hi Concrete.35 Although only the
ten-year presumption was at issue in Mile Hi Concrete, the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding seemed equally applicable to the other statutory presumptions
of section 13-21-403. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the logic in Mile Hi
Concrete should also apply to the state-of-the-art presumption.36 The Tenth
24. 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
25. 33 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
26. 4 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1993).
27. Id. at 867.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 874.
30. Id. at 875.
31. Wagner, 33 F.3d at 1254.
32. Id. at 1255.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1254.




Circuit stated that, similar to the ten year presumption, the state-of-the-art
presumption was merely a rebuttable presumption directed against the plaintiff
and was not applicable once the plaintiff presented a prima facie case and
withstood the defendant's motion for a directed verdict." The Tenth Circuit
held that the trial court's instruction was erroneous, and reversed and remand-
ed the case for a new trial.3
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit correctly ascertained and applied Colorado law in both
Perlmutter and Wagner. The Perlmutter decision was fairly simple to decide
because the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled on the exact issue the year
before in Mile Hi Concrete.39 The Wagner case would have been decided in
similar fashion if the Tenth Circuit had utilized the principle case cited by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Mile Hi Concrete: Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc.'
In Mile Hi Concrete, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal's reasoning in Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc."1 In Sex-
ton, the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine what effect Kentucky's state-
of-the-art presumption42 . would have in products liability actions.43 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that Kentucky's state-of-the-art presumption should
not be given once a plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of a product's
defectiveness." In Mile Hi Concrete, the court cited the Sexton decision and
stated, "[w]e share the view of the Fourth Circuit that an instruction based on
such a statutory presumption is meaningless."4
Possibly due to a citation error, the Colorado Supreme Court cited the
Sexton decision as though it involved Kentucky's time-based presumption
rather than its state-of-the-art presumption.' Had the Tenth Circuit analyzed
37. Id. at 1256.
38. Id. at 1257.
39. 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
40. 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
41. See Mile Hi Concrete, 842 P.2d at 205 n.12 (citing Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926
F.2d 331 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991)).
42. Kentucky has a state-of-the-art presumption similar to Colorado's section 13-21-
403(1)(a). The Kentucky statute states:
In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence to the contrary, that the product was not defective if the design, methods of
manufacture, and testing conformed to the generally recognized and prevailing standards
or the state of the art in existence at the time the design was prepared, and the product
was manufactured.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992). Kentucky also has a time-based
presumption similar to Colorado's ten-year presumption:
In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a preponderance of
the evidence to the contrary, that the subject product was not defective if the injury,
death or property damage occurred either more than five (5) years after the date of the
sale to the first consumer or more than eight (8) years after the date of manufacture.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
43. Sexton, 926 F.2d at 332-33.
44. Id. at 333.
45. Mile Hi Concrete, 842 P.2d at 205 n.12 (citation omitted).
46. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court cited KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1), as being the
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the Sexton decision, it could have avoided speculating as to whether the Colo-
rado Supreme Court intended its reasoning in Mile Hi Concrete to apply with
equal force to the state-of-the-art presumption. The Tenth Circuit could have
stated with certainty that the Colorado Supreme Court would have denied Case
corporation's request for an instruction on the state-of-the-art presumption
because Wagner had produced sufficient evidence that the loader/backhoe was
defective.
Mile Hi Concrete and its progeny essentially render Colorado's statutory
presumptions meaningless. A careful reading of Mile Hi Concrete reveals the
Colorado Supreme Court's desire to strip both the ten-year and state-of-the-art
presumptions of all effect in future products liability cases. The effect given to
the presumptions by the Colorado Supreme Court in Mile High Concrete does
not alter the burden of production or the burden of persuasion that would exist
without the presumptions. A plaintiff still needs to produce sufficient evidence
of a product's defectiveness in order to withstand a defendant's motion for a
directed verdict.47
Mile Hi Concrete was essentially a judicial repeal of state legislation. The
Colorado Supreme Court took two state statutes that were obviously intended
to have some effect in products liability actions, stripped them of all effect,
and left two empty statutory provisions on the books. The Tenth Circuit is
basically powerless to do anything about the proper function of the state
supreme courts and legislative functions since it is bound by the Erie doctrine
to apply state law as the state's highest court would.'
Perlmutter and Wagner do not stand for the proposition that state-of-the-
art evidence and evidence that a product has been marketed for many years
without any claims of defectiveness are no longer relevant in products liability
actions. On the contrary, the fact that a product conformed to the state-of-the-
art at the time of its manufacture, or that a product has been on the market for
statute at issue in Sexton rather than § 411.310(2). Id. Section 411.310(1) codifies the time-based
presumption, while 411.310(2) codifies the state-of-the-art presumption. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.310 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
47. In any case governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must, at a
minimum, raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand a defendant's motion for
summary judgement. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A "directed verdict acts somewhat like a delayed
summary judgement motion in that it determines that there are no genuine issues of fact that need
to be sent to the jury." FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 2, § 12.3, at 544. A motion for a directed
verdict can "be made by either party at the close of their opponent's evidence." Id. § 12.3, at 543.
Thus, the Mile Hi Concrete holding, followed by the Tenth Circuit in Perlmutter and Wag-
ner, states no more than what is already stated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If a plain-
tiff, in a products liability case, did not introduce sufficient evidence of a product's defectiveness,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would compel a trial judge to grant the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, regardless of whether a statutory presumption also compelled her to do so.
See Mile Hi Concrete, 842 P.2d at 205.
The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure requirements for summary judgements and directed
verdicts are nearly identical to the provisions found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dis-
cussed above. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 50 (concerning directed verdicts); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Langdon, 532 P.2d 337, 340 (Colo. 1975) (stating that "[a] motion for a directed verdict can only
be granted where the evidence, when so considered, compels the conclusion that the minds of
reasonable men could not be in disagreement"); see also COLO. R. Civ. P. 56 (concerning summa-
ry judgements).
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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a substantial period of time without any claims of defectiveness, may be whol-
ly relevant in design defect and failure to warn products liability actions. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court recently decided a case in which it held
state-of-the-art evidence relevant in a products liability action based on failure
to warn claims in order "to determine whether the product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous."'49 Perlmutter and Wagner simply hold that an in-
struction based on the state-of-the-art or ten-year presumption should not be
given once the plaintiff has introduced evidence from which a reasonable juror
could find that the product in question was indeed defective."0
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE DESIGN DEFECT CASE IN UTAH:
ALLEN V. MINNSTAR, INC.5
A. Background
In the 1979 case Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.," Utah adopt-
ed the doctrine of strict products liability as set forth in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 402A imposes liability on the manufac-
turer and/or seller of a product that is in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" to the user or consumer.53 Although the Restatement provides
comments that help explain section 402A, none of these comments were
adopted by the Hahn court. Thus, lower courts were provided no help in de-
fining a "defective condition [that is] unreasonably dangerous." T he U t a h
Supreme Court first attempted to define the phrase in the 1982 case Dowland
v. Lyman Products for Shooters.
4 In Dowland, the court applied comment g
of section 402A, which defines a defective condition." Comment g defines a
defective condition as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
56 Although the Utah legisla-
ture has since addressed comment g's "consumer-contemplation" test, the
essence of the test remains the same. 7
Finally, in the 1991 case Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,"8 the Utah Supreme
Court held that all drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration
49. Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo. 1993).
50. Perlmutter, 4 F.3d at 875; Wagner, 33 F.3d at 1257.
51. 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
52. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
54. 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982).
55. Id. at 381 n.2.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965). The rule only applies when
the "product is in a defective condition when it leaves the seller's hands." Id. Comment g's defi-
nition of "defective condition" is often referred to as the "consumer-contemplation" test. See gen-
erally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 698-99 (5th
ed. 1984) (discussing the consumer-contemplation test).
57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2) (1992). The Utah Product Liability Act defines "unrea-
sonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in that community considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge,
training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer." Id.
58. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
(FDA) were unavoidably unsafe products, and that as long as the drugs were
properly prepared, marketed, and distributed with appropriate warnings, sellers
of such drugs would not be strictly liable for unfortunate consequences attend-
ing their use.59 In Grundberg, the court used a "risk-utility" balancing test
and held that the utility of FDA approved drugs outweighed the reasons to
afford plaintiffs an additional means of recovery.' By explicitly adopting the
reasoning of comment k of section 402A, the court provided broad immunity
from strict liability claims based on design defects to manufacturers and sellers
of FDA approved drugs.6
B. The Tenth Circuit Defines a Prima Facie Design Defect Case:
Allen v. Minnstar, Inc.62
In Allen, the plaintiff, who had been struck and severely injured by a boat
propeller, brought a strict product liability action against the manufacturers of
the boat and engine. 63 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant manufactures and Allen appealed.' 4 Allen contended that the
trial court erred in holding that he was required to prove the existence of a
safer alternative design.65 Allen argued that the Utah Supreme Court, in ap-
plying the strict liability principles of section 402A, had previously not re-
quired plaintiffs to prove the existence of a safer alternative design.' Accord-
ing to Allen, the Tenth Circuit itself had previously held, in Karns v. Emerson
Electric Co.,67 that demonstrating the existence of a safer alternative design
and the state-of-the-art in the industry was not an essential element of a
plaintiff's prima facie case.' s Unpersuaded by Allen's argument, the Tenth
Circuit, relying on Pree v. Brunswick Corp.69 and Elliot v. Brunswick
Corp.,70 held in favor of the manufacturer.7
In both Pree and Elliot, plaintiffs injured by unguarded boat propellers
sued the manufacturer for defective design. 72 Applying the consumer-contem-
59. Id. at 90.
60. Id. at 99.
61. Id. Comment k recognizes that some products, like drugs, are "unavoidably unsafe." The
comment does not go as far as the Utah Supreme Court to state that all FDA approved drugs
should be given the label "unavoidably unsafe" in order to give their manufacturers and sellers
immunity from strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); see also
Adam F. Trupp, Comment, A Step Backwards in Products Liability Law: The Utah Supreme
Court and Comment K, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 101, 122 (discussing how only a minority of juris-
dictions, including Utah, apply comment k as a form of broad immunity for all drugs approved by
the FDA).
62. 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
63. Id. at 1472.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1477.
66. Id.
67. 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987).
68. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1477 (citing Karns, 817 F.2d at 1457).
69. 983 F.2d 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 65 (1993).
70. 903 F.2d 1505 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991).
71. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1477.
72. Id. at 1477-78 (citing Pree, 983 F.2d at 864; Elliot, 903 F.2d at 1506).
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plation test embodied in comment i of section 402A,73 both courts held that
the dangers inherent in unguarded propellers should have been apparent to, or
within the contemplation of, the ordinary consumer.7 4 The courts held, there-
fore, that the unguarded propellers were not "unreasonably dangerous" within
the meaning of section 402A."
The Tenth Circuit noted that comment i of section 402A, relied upon by
the Pree and Elliot courts, had not been adopted in Utah."6 Nevertheless, the
Tenth Circuit found that the trial court did not err in holding that it was in-
cumbent on the plaintiff to prove that an "alternative safer design, practicable
under the circumstances, was available at the time the boat and engine were
sold."77
C. Analysis
Based on the majority of courts interpretations in this area, it is clear that
the Tenth Circuit correctly held that Allen needed to establish the existence of
a safer alternative design to prevail in his products liability claim.7" Although
some courts have erroneously held that such proof is not required, and is
merely one factor to be considered in determining whether a product is defec-
tive, 9 many other jurisdictions, and the tentative draft of the Restatement
73. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
74. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1477-78 (citing Pree, 983 F.2d at 867; Elliot, 903 F.2d at 1507).
75. Id. at 1478.
76. Id. at 1479.
77. Id. Plaintiffs are required to prove the existence of a safer alternative design because
public policy dictates that manufacturers should not be liable for injuries caused by their products
when those products could not have been made safer given the technology existing at the time the
product was originally manufactured. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 99, at 701 (discussing
how "[ilt is generally agreed that a product cannot be regarded as defectively designed when sold
simply because after the sale and prior to the time of trial or to the time of a claimant's injury,
there was a technological breakthrough ... making it possible to eliminate a risk of harm ... or
reduce the magnitude of the danger from the risk"); see also Jefferey N. Diamant, Comment,
Texas Senate Bill 4: Product Liability Legislation Analyzed, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 921, 941 (1994)
(discussing how the defectiveness of a product under the common law of Texas was almost al-
ways determined in relation to safer alternatives, and that recent legislation in Texas, which re-
quires plaintiffs to prove the existence of a safer design, does not really change Texas common
law on the issue, but merely codifies the standard of proof).
Allowing liability in situations where a product could not be safer would place an enor-
mous burden on manufacturers, which in turn would discourage manufacturing and result in high-
er consumer prices for manufactured products. Making the plaintiff prove that a safer design exist-
ed, or should have existed, essentially injects principles of negligence into the issue of whether a
manufacturer of a product should be liable for injuries occasioned by its use. If the manufacturer
could have designed a safer product, without excessive costs to itself or to the consumer, then the
manufacturer could be considered negligent for failing to do so, and the product sold would be
considered in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous because of such failure. See generally
WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 741 n.3 (8th ed. 1988)
(questioning whether incorporating state of the art evidence in products liability cases would re-
turn products liability law to negligence standards). For a discussion of the goals and underlying
policies of Section 402A and strict products liability in general, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmts. a, b, c (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal.
1963).
78. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1479.
79. See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987). In Kallio the court
held that: "[allthough normally evidence of a safer alternative design will be presented initially by
1995]
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(Third) of Torts, are in accord with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Allen."°
Provided that the Tenth Circuit's decision is not read as adopting the
"open and obvious" danger rule, as embodied in the consumer-contemplation
test. of section 402A comment i,8  it is probably an accurate application of
Utah products liability law. The Tenth Circuit reliance on the Pree and Elliot
holdings, however, does not mean that the court intended to adopt the per se
rule of non-defectiveness for certain products embodied in comment i. Com-
ment i's premise undermines the rationale of strict liability and does not pro-
mote the purposes behind the doctrine. In fact, comment i has been rejected by
the vast majority of states, 2 and by the American Law Institute in its tenta-
tive draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.83 Additionally, the "open and
obvious" danger rule arguably has been rejected in Utah.
the plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases. Such evidence is relevant to, and certainly
may be an important factor in, the determination of whether the product was unreasonably defec-
tive." Id. at 96-97 (footnote omitted). At least one court has held that state of the art evidence is
irrelevant because the focus of the inquiry is the "defective condition of the product... not the
manufacturer's knowledge." See, e.g., Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo.
1984).
80. See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 987 F.2d 1410, 1421-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
there was insufficient evidence that an alternative design of a cigarette lighter was practicable and
feasible); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Or. 1978) (holding that the plain-
tiff did not produce sufficient evidence that a substitute design was practicable); Boatland of
Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980) (stating "[wihether a product was de-
fectively designed must be judged against the technological context existing at the time of its
manufacture"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
("A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller ... and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe .... ").
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). Comment i is sometimes
referred to as the "inherent characteristics" rule. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS, 751 n.1 (8th ed. 1988). It essentially "means that liability should not be imposed when
harm results because of danger or risk that is inherent in a product." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (stating that "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics").
Comment i stands for the proposition that certain products are per se not defective. Id. The
comment uses whiskey, butter, and tobacco as examples of products that are not unreasonably
dangerous, provided they are not contaminated. Id. According to the drafters of the Restatement,
"[g]ood butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cho-
lesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks." Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c, reporters' note, at 49 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1994) (noting that "[a] strong majority of courts have rejected the 'open and obvious,' or 'pat-
ent danger rule' as an absolute defense to a claim of design defect" and instead consider the "ob-
viousness of the danger ... [as] one factor among many as to whether a product design meets
risk-utility norms").
83. See id. § 2 cmt. c, at 17 (stating "[t]he fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant
to the issue of defectiveness, but does not preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable
alternative design should have been adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to the
plaintiff").
If this principle is adopted, products such as whiskey, tobacco, and butter could be deemed
defective if the plaintiff could show that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced or
prevented her injuries. See id. at 17-18.
84. See House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (hold-
ing "that the presence of an 'open and obvious danger' is merely one factor for the trier of fact to
consider when assessing the liability of the defendant in a strict liability case" based on a failure
to wam).
In House, the court cited Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in
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The doctrine of strict products liability was adopted in most states for
public policy reasons. 5 Supporters of strict liability for manufacturers of de-
fective products argue that strict liability is appropriate because: 1) manufac-
turers are in a better position to protect against harm; 2) public policy dictates
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products be borne by the
manufacturers that placed such products in the market rather than by the per-
sons injured by them; 3) manufacturers can more readily obtain liability insur-
ance for harm, and in turn, pass that added cost on to the consuming public by
charging higher prices for the goods; and 4) public policy demands that the
costs of accidents be placed on the party best able to determine whether there
are means to prevent the harm.86
These public policy goals are not served by the per se rule of non-defec-
tiveness embodied in comment i. Manufacturers of dangerous products can
more readily insure against injuries occasioning their use and pass that cost
along to the consuming public. By making manufacturers bear the costs for
injuries caused by their products, manufacturers of dangerous products are
forced to consider carefully the relative worth of placing such products on the
market. Permitting a manufacturer to avoid liability whenever its product's
dangers might be considered open and obvious is simply inconsistent with the
entire rationale of strict liability.
This is not to say that a per se rule of non-defectiveness is inappropriate
in all circumstances. Comment k, for instance, establishes a per se rule of non-
defectiveness for some products, such as drugs, deemed "unavoidably un-
safe."87 This comment was applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Grunberg
v. Upjohn Co.88 to grant blanket immunity to manufacturers of FDA ap-
proved drugs. Unlike comment i's "open and obvious" immunity, comment k's
immunity does not undermine the doctrine and rationale of strict products
liability. Good reasons exist for granting blanket immunity for manufacturers
of FDA approved drugs. Imposing liability on manufacturers of FDA approved
drugs any time a user suffers an unfortunate reaction to those drugs could
have a chilling effect on manufacturers, and thereby keep possibly life-saving
products from being marketed. Additionally, the requirement of FDA approval
ensures that the drugs are safe for consumption by the vast majority of users.
Allen does not, however, adopt explicitly the logic of comment i and the
per se rule of non-defectiveness for products whose dangers are "open and
obvious." Allen only requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a safer and
practicable alternative design when the dangers associated with a product are
support of its argument for abandoning the open and obvious danger rule as a complete defense.
House, 886 P.2d at 548. The Donahue court only abandoned the rule as a defense in negligence
cases. Donahue, 780 P.2d at 1279. However, the House court expanded the decision and aban-
doned the rule in strict liability cases as well. House, 886 P.2d at 548.
85. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 98, at 692-93 (listing some of the public policy
justifications that have been the basis for many courts decision to adopt strict liability in tort).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (listing the public policy argu-
ments in favor of strict liability); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, § 98, at 692-93 (listing
the public policy justifications for adopting strict liability in tort).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
88. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
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open and obvious.89 The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
actually goes further than the Allen court. The tentative draft requires plain-
tiffs, in all design defect cases, to prove that a safer alternative design exist-
ed.' Such proof is also required by many states in design defect claims.9 In
contrast, under Allen it is possible that plaintiffs will not be required to prove
the existence of a safer design in cases where the dangers associated with the
product are latent rather than patent.
The Tenth Circuit struck a fair compromise between the needs of manu-
facturers and the needs of consumers by requiring proof of a safer alternative
design. Since plaintiffs can still prevail in design defect actions when manu-
facturers neglect to adopt reasonable alternative designs, the rule should en-
courage manufacturers to design safer products.
III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A DEFENSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS:
HOLT V. DEERE & CO.
92
A. Background
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first recognized voluntary assumption of
risk as a defense in strict products liability actions in Kirkland v. General
Motors Corp.9a In Kirkland, the court stated that assumption of the risk in
products liability actions should be narrowly defined as "[violuntary assump-
tion of the risk of a known defect." ' The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not
discuss the defense again until 1979 in Jordan v. General Motors Corp.95 In
Jordan, the court held that, because there was evidence that the plaintiff knew
his car had a tendency to veer, a question of fact was presented as to whether
he had voluntarily assumed the risk of a known defect.96 The Jordan decision
clearly states a preference for submitting assumption of risk to the jury. Based
on the logic utilized by the court in Jordan, a plaintiff's general knowledge of
a defect is apparently sufficient evidence upon which to instruct the jury on
assumption of risk.97
In 1988, the Tenth Circuit decided McMurray v. Deere & Co.,9' a prod-
ucts liability case brought by the wife of a man who was killed when a tractor
he was using started in gear.99 The plaintiff argued on appeal that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant the trial court's instructing the jury on the
defense of voluntary assumption of the risk."° The Tenth Circuit agreed and
reiterated a statement it had made six years earlier in Bingham v.
89. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1479.
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
91. See cases cited supra note 80.
92. 24 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1994).
93. 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974).
94. Id.
95. 590 P.2d 193 (Okla. 1979).
96. Id. at 196.
97. Id.
98. 858 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1988).
99. Id. at 1441.
100. Id. at 1439-40.
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Hollingsworth Manufacturing Co.,"° that Oklahoma trial courts may not
grant summary judgments based on a plaintiff's assumption of risk if no proof
was introduced that the plaintiff had specific knowledge of the risk." The
Tenth Circuit further stated that for a manufacturer to avail itself of the as-
sumption of risk defense, it must prove that the plaintiff had "[s]ubjective
awareness of both the defect and consequent risk of injury."'0 3 The Tenth
Circuit stated that it was proper to submit the defense to the jury even where
the direct evidence of the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk was unclear."
One month after McMurray, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Thom-
as v. Holliday, 5 which described instances where assumption of risk would
be a valid defense in Oklahoma." Following the 1979 decision in Jor-
dan, '7 Oklahoma implemented a comparative negligence scheme, and the
Thomas decision was intended to clarify and distinguish assumption of the risk
from comparative negligence. In Thomas, the court noted that comparative
negligence was often mislabeled assumption of risk." In attempting to de-
fine the two defenses, the court stated, "[t]he touchstone of the assumption-of-
risk defense is consent to harm and not heedlessness or indifference.""°
Against this backdrop, the Tenth Circuit decided Holt v. Deere & Co."'
B. The Tenth Circuit Applies Oklahoma Assumption of Risk Principles:
Holt v. Deere & Co."'
1. The Majority Opinion
In Holt, a mechanic was severely injured when the road grader he was
working on started in gear."2 The jury returned a verdict finding that Holt
failed to establish the essential elements of his products liability claim, and
further, that Holt had voluntarily assumed the risk of a known defect."3 Holt
appealed both issues. Rather than affirm the jury's verdict based on its finding
that Holt had not proven the essential elements of his products liability claim,
the Tenth Circuit relied on the jury's finding that Holt had voluntarily as-
sumed the risk of a known defect."4 By affirming the jury's finding on the
assumption of risk issue, the majority found it unnecessary to address the
jury's conclusion that Holt had not proven the elements of his products liabili-
101. 695 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1982).
102. McMurray, 858 F.2d at 1440 (citing Bingham, 695 F.2d at 449).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1441 n.5 (citing Bingham, 695 F.2d at 449).
105. 764 P.2d 165 (Okla. 1988).
106. Id. at 169-70.
107. Jordan v. General Motors Corp., 590 P.2d 193, 196 (Okla. 1979); see supra text accom-
panying notes 95-97.
108. Thomas, 764 P.2d at 171.
109. Id. at 169.
110. 24 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1994).
111. Id.
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ty claim."'
Holt argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence presented at
trial to warrant an assumption of the risk instruction to the jury."6 The trial
record indicated that two of Holt's co-workers knew the road-grader could be
started in gear."'7 The record also revealed that Holt had explained the inci-
dent to his supervisor from his hospital bed, and had stated either "I don't
know why I did it," or "I knew better than that."
'" 8
Holt argued that Deere did not introduce sufficient evidence from which
the jury could find that Holt knew the neutral start switch had failed or was
prone to failure."9 Deere, on the other hand, argued that the test of subjec-
tive awareness enunciated in McMurray only required proof that Holt knew of
the road-grader's "defective condition" and that he appreciated the risk of
injury this condition presented to him when he tried to start the machine while
standing on the ground. 2 Although the evidence of Holt's knowledge of the
road-grader's defect did not appear to meet either articulation of assumption of
the risk, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless held that the jury could have deter-
mined, based on the evidence, that Holt had voluntarily assumed the risk of a
known defect.''
2. Judge Holloway's concurrence
Judge Holloway disagreed with the majority's holding that there was
sufficient evidence to support an instruction on the defense of voluntary as-
sumption of risk. 2 ' Holloway noted that the two men who knew the machine
could be key-started in gear admitted that they had never told anyone of the
fact.'23 Holloway also argued that the words spoken by Holt were obviously
uttered under the stress of great pain and were not very probative of Holt's
knowledge of the defect."4 Judge Holloway concluded that Holt's statement
was insufficient to warrant an instruction on assumption of risk without some
form of corroborating evidence. 25 While ultimately concurring in the opinion
because he believed sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding
that Holt had not proven the essential elements of his product's liability claim,




116. Id. at 1292.
117. Id. at 1294.
118. Id. at 1295.
119. Id. at 1292-94.
120. Id. at 1292.
121. Id. at 1293-94.
122. Id. at 1296 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. ld. at 1297 & n.l.
124. Id.





The Restatement (Second) of Torts was instrumental in establishing as-
sumption of risk as a defense in strict products liability action. 27 The Re-
statement defines assumption of risk as "the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger.""'2 In expounding on this definition, section 402A comment n
provides, "[i]f the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."'2 9 Oklahoma has adopted
section 402A of the Restatement, including comment n, but has yet to define
the exact degree of plaintiff's knowledge required to warrant an instruction on
assumption of risk. 3 While the modem trend has been to limit the circum-
stances in which the assumption of risk defense will be allowed to bar a
plaintiff's recovery, 3' Oklahoma law is essentially silent on the circumstanc-
es surrounding the appropriate use of assumption of risk in strict products
liability actions. Oklahoma courts have only stated that the defense can be
used in those situations in which the plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably
assumed the risk of a known defect. 32 This statement provides little more
guidance than comment n to section 402A.
Limited precedent existed to guide the Tenth Circuit in deciding Holt. The
precedent that did exist, most notably the Jordan decision, indicated that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court preferred submitting the issue of assumption of risk
to the jury whenever there was any evidence from which a reasonable juror
could conclude that the plaintiff had assumed the risk."' Thus, the Tenth
Circuit probably decided the issue as the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
have if confronted with the issue.
Judge Holloway's concurring opinion, however, is more in accord with
the majority of jurisdictions that have either abolished or extremely curtailed
the use of the defense."4 The Erie Doctrine mandates that federal courts are
to ascertain and apply state law so that the outcome reached in federal court is
the same outcome that would have been reached if the case had been tried in
state court. 3 From Holt's statement, "I don't know why I did it," or "I
knew better than that," an inference can be made that Holt knew the road-
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965) (specifically providing for
a defense of assumption of risk in products liability actions). See generally Ann D. Bray, Does
Old Wine Get Better with Age or Turn to Vinegar? Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Fault
Era-Andren v. White Rodgers, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1141, 1161-66 (1992) (discussing the
rationale underlying the assumption of risk defense in products liability cases).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
129. Id.
130. See Thomas v. Holliday, 794 P.2d 165 (Okla. 1988).
131. See Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 873
(1982).
132. See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1974).
133. Jordan, 590 P.2d at 196; see supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
134. See Note, supra note 131, at 873.
135. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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grader would key-start in gear and thus knew of its defective condition.
36
This inference, while somewhat tenuous, could nevertheless be made by a rea-
sonable juror. Because a reasonable juror could draw this inference, an instruc-
tion on assumption of risk was proper under Oklahoma law.
CONCLUSION
The four cases analyzed in this survey illustrate the different approaches
taken by Tenth Circuit when applying the Erie Doctrine. The Tenth Circuit's
Erie jurisprudence varies depending on the amount, nature, and quality of a
state court's treatment of a particular issue. In Perlmutter and Wagner, the
Tenth Circuit, given a clear indication from the Colorado Supreme Court as to
how it would decide the issue, correctly ascertained and applied Colorado law.
Allen presented more difficult problems for the Tenth Circuit because the Utah
Supreme Court had given no indication as to how it would resolve the issue.
Lacking any guidance from the Utah courts, the Tenth Circuit opted to decide
the case in accordance with the modem trend. In Holt, language from various
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions indicated the court's preference for sub-
mitting the issue of assumption of risk to the jury in most instances. The
Tenth Circuit recognized this inclination, and, most likely, decided the issue as




136. Holt, 24 F.3d at 1293-94.
137. Presently, tort law is the subject of debate in the United States Congress. The Republican
Party's "Contract with America" could result in dramatic changes. One part of the "contract"
concerns legal reform. These reforms would significantly alter existing products liability law in
many respects. The reforms would create a uniform products liability law (covering state and
federal actions) in three different areas: punitive damages, joint liability, and seller liability.
GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). While
these reforms will be the subject of heated debate, every attorney should become familiar with the
proposed legal reforms and keep them in mind when advising clients in the future, at least until
the issues are resolved.
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